1 Joint Laboratory in Engineering Sciences, EPO, Burkina Faso, 18 BP 234 Ouaga 18, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
2 University of Lédéa Bernard Ouédraogo, Ouahigouya, Burkina Faso, 01 BP 346 Ouahigouya 01, Burkina Faso.
3 Société Nationale Burkinabè d'Hydrocarbures (SONABHY), Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 01 BP 4394 Ouagadougou 01 -BF.
4 Industrie Partenariat Développement (IPADEV), Burkina Faso, BP 2077 Bobo-Dioulasso.
* Corresponding Author
GSC Advanced Research and Reviews, 2026, 29(02), 158–172
Article DOI: 10.30574/gscarr.2026.29.2.0303
Received on 20 September 2026; revised on 27 October 2026; accepted on 29 October 2026
Petroleum depots combine major-accident and occupational hazards that are usually assessed separately. This study proposes an integration step that links the outputs of a Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP) and a Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA) through shared root causes and shared safety barriers, and applies it to the Bingo depot (Burkina Faso), which recorded 12 occupational accidents and 9 fire outbreaks in 2022. HAZOP of the largest diesel tank (fixed-roof tank R08) was complemented by screening calculations of boilover propensity, thin-layer boilover onset time, emergency venting and fire protection capacity. HIRA rated 48 hazardous situations at four workstations using a semi-quantitative risk-control index NM = NE × NG × NP. The integration identified six root causes, five of them common to both analyses; the corresponding shared barriers (notably interlocks, ignition control in ATEX zones and remote gauging) address 27 of the 48 workplace situations, including 17 of the 22 uncontrolled ones, while also acting on the major-accident chain. Fire protection analysis showed that water pumping covers a bund fire even under N−1 conditions, whereas the single foam concentrate pump is saturated (99%) in the reference scenario and insufficient (126%) in an envelope scenario. Diesel exceeds the PBO screening threshold (1.20 vs 0.6), but experimental evidence points to a thin-layer boilover with an estimated onset of 21–58 h. Of the 48 situations, 44 (91.7%) do not reach the controlled class of the adopted index. The approach yields a single prioritised action plan transferable to other West African depots.
HAZOP; HIRA; Safety barriers; Thin-layer boilover; Fire protection; Petroleum depot
Preview Article PDF
Souleymane Ramdé, Arzouma Adama Pierre Ouedraogo and Joseph K. Ramde. INTEGRATED PROCESS AND OCCUPATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN A SAHELIAN PETROLEUM DEPOT USING HAZOP–HIRA: THE BINGO DEPOT CASE STUDY. GSC Advanced Research and Reviews, 2026, 29(02), 158–172. Article DOI: https://doi.org/10.30574/gscarr.2026.29.2.0303